Transition-Based Coverage Estimation for Symbolic Model Checking

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Agenda

Introduction
Transition Coverage Metric
Transition Coverage Computation
Experimental Results
Summary

Coverage for model checking

- The validation is exhaustive only for functions specified by properties
 - Properties are written manually.
 - Hard to determine completeness of properties
- A design error might not be detected by model checking

If the erroneous behavior is not checked by specified properties.

- Coverage for model checking is responsible for revealing such unchecked behaviors.
 - Specifying additional properties for higher verification quality

Related works

- State coverage Hoskote et al. DAC'99 Jayakumar. et al. DAC03 Chockler et al. CAV'01
 - Select a signal as observed signal
 - Change the value of the signal on one state
 - Whether any property get failed
- High-level fault model Fummi et al MEMOCODE'03
 Mutation based on RT-level fault model
- Transition coverage Chockler et al. CHARM'03
 Omit or replace transitions (or paths)
- for symbolic simulation Wang et al. FORTE'03
 Numerical safety analysis for real-time system
- Transition Traversal coverage Xu et al. ASICON'05
 Transitions are traversed by CTL operators

Related works State coverage metric

the original state machine satisfies the property AX(q=1)

select q as observed signal, change its value on state s1,
AX(q=1) is no longer satisfied
→ State s1 is covered for q.

The coverage metric is practically useful.
 One of the limitations
 State based, not transition or path based.
 How about transition coverage metric?

Problem Definition

Input:

given a state machine
a set of satisfied property
Select one observed signal

Output

- a set of transitions,
- On which the value of the signal is (not) checked

the state machine satisfies the property AX(q=1), which transition is covered for q? (r1)

Our contribution

- A novel transition coverage metric
 Extension of the state coverage metric
 Symbolic algorithms for coverage computation
 Based on states traversing
 Use states to represent covered transitions
 Focus on transitions of FSM for HW verification

 Practicality

 Meaningful coverage holes uncovered with low
 - Meaningful coverage holes uncovered with low computation overhead

Transition Perturbation

- For a general state transition diagram
 - ♦ Select one observed signal q
 ♦ For one transition r1=(S0,S1)
 - Make a copy of state S1 as Sq
 - Change the value of q in Sq
 - Re-direct r1 to Sq
 - Copy the transitions starting from S1 to Sq.
- Not only change state labels, but also change transition relation

A transition is covered if any property satisfied by original STD gets failed on the perturbed STD.

AXq=1 AXAXAXq=1

Intuition of the coverage



- Pinpoint the transition through which the value of observed signal is checked
 - change the labels of a state same as state metric
 - change the transition relation so that only one transition reaches the changed state, while all other transitions are reserved

 Provide coverage information on both signal value and transition relation

- Hardware Verification
 - Designs are modeled as FSM
 - We talk about the transition coverage of FSM
 - FSM is translated to Kripke structure for model checking properties referring to input signals

The FSM <S,I,O, , S₀> is translated to the Kripke structure <S × I,R,L,S_{k0}>, where

- (<s,i>,<s',i'>) R iff (s,i)=s'

 $- L(\langle s,i \rangle) = i s (s,i)$

Hardware Verification





transition coverage can be computed based on the states of the kripke structure \diamond For each state of K, the next states have same values for FSM state variables. Select FSM state variable as observed signals when a transition is covered, all transitions from the same state are covered. \diamond just need to record the state \diamond the state represents a transition of FSM <s,i> → (s,i)=s'

 Formal Definition on Kripke structure for FSM
 According to the transition from FSM to Kripke structure, we formally define our coverage as:

 For the Kripke structure, given an observed signal q and state r_i (it represents a transition of FSM), for each state r_i with (r_i,r_i) R, add a state r_i^q S^q

For each state t

$$L_{r}^{q}(t) = \begin{cases} L(t) & \text{if } t \notin S^{q}; \\ L(r_{j}) \setminus \{q\} & \text{if } t = r_{j}^{q} \text{ and } \{q\} \in L(r_{j}); \\ L(r_{j}) \cup \{q\} & \text{if } t = r_{j}^{q} \text{ and } \{q\} \notin L(r_{j}). \end{cases}$$

For each state pair (t_i, t_j) ,

$$(t_i, t_j) \in R_r^q \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} (r_j, t_j) \in R & \text{if } t_i = r_j^q; \\ true & \text{if } t_i = r_i \text{ and } t_j = r_j^q; \\ false & \text{if } t_i = r_i \text{ and } t_j = r_j; \\ (t_i, t_j) \in R & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

r_i is covered w.r.t. q if any property is no longer satisfied on the perturbed Kripke structure

 $coverage = \frac{number \ of \ covered \ transitions}{number \ of \ reachable \ transitions}$

The transition coverage metric is general for any specification language like CTL

consider a subset of CTL for easy computation

- Expressive for most properties
- The subset is defined as:

♦ if b propositional, then b is within the subset;
 ♦ if f and g are within the subset, then so are AXf, AGf, AfUg, AfRg, f g, b→f.

The computation is performed on Kripke structure

Symbolic algorithm based on BDD and fix-point operation

while traversing a transition, we extract the correctness conditions from the property for the reached states, the transition is identified as covered if the correctness condition depends on the value of the observed signal.

Three steps:

- Traverse transitions according to CTL operators
- Check the value of observed signal on states
- Backward traversing for the covered transitions



```
Cov(\varphi, S){
           if (S == empty) return empty;
            if (\varphi is propositional) return empty;
            switch (\varphi)
             case f \wedge g: result = Cov(f, S) \cup Cov(g, S);
            case b \to q: result = Cov(q, S \cap Sat(b));
             case AGf : result = Cov(f, Rch(S));
             caseAXf:
                       cf = Chk(f, Fwd(S));
                       r1 = Bwd(cf) \cap S; r2 = Cov(f, Fwd(S));
                       result = r1 \cup r2:
             case AfUg:
                          fTrv = empty; qTrv = empty;
                         qS = Sat(q); doS = S;
                        do{
                                    qTrv = qTrv \cup (doS \cap qS);
                                    fS = doS \setminus qS;
                                    if(fS \neq empty){
                                                 fTrv = fTrv \cup fS;
                                                doS = Fwd(fS) \setminus (fTrv \cup qTrv);
                           \frac{1}{100} \frac{1}
                        c1 = Chk(f, fTrv); c2 = Chk(a, aTrv)
                        r1 = fTrv \cap Bwd(c1); r2 = fTrv \cap Bwd(c2);
                        r3 = Cov(f, fTrv); r4 = Cov(q, qTrv);
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   3
                        result = r1 \cup r2 \cup r3 \cup r4;
             case f Rq : //similar to fUq
             default : Unacceptable formula;
            return result;
```

```
Chk(\varphi, S)
  if (S == empty) return empty;
  if (\varphi is propositional)
     result = S \cap Sat(\neg \varphi|_{a \to \neg a});
     return result:
  switch (\varphi)
  case f \wedge q: result = Chk(f, S) \cup Chk(q, S);
  case b \rightarrow q: result = Chk(q, S \cap Sat(b));
  case AGf: result = Chk(f, S);
  caseAXf : result = empty;
  case AfUq:
     r1 = Chk(q, S \cap Sat(q));
     r2 = Chk(f, S \setminus Sat(q));
     result = r1 \cup r2:
  casefRq: //similar to fUq
  default : Unacceptable formula;
  return result;
```

 Forward transition traversing according to the semantics of CTL

Different with computing witness paths

 No need for the sequence of transitions

 For example: the STD satisfies AfUg

 There are two set of states traversed by AfUg
 f set {S0,S1,S2,S5}; g set {S3,S4,S6}



- Dependency check for observed signal
 - whether the satisfaction of the sub-formula on reached states is dependent on the value of observed signal

- Backward traverse to obtain the covered "transitions"
 - Our target is transitions of FSM which are represented as states of kripke structure
 - Different transitions from one state in the kripke structure reflect all possible inputs in the next clock



- Implemented based on VIS using CUDD
 - Language C
 - About 1K lines
- Intermediate results by Model Checking is used by coverage estimation
 - Save computation
- experiments are run on IBM IntelliStation Z-Pro
 - 3.0GHZ CPU
 - 2.3GB RAM.
 - Linux system

circuit

- Full-map directory-based cache coherence protocol
- Simplified with only one bit per cache
- Configurable number of processor and memory entry
- Properties
 - 19 properties
 - Not include invariant properties AG(b)
 - Most are in the form of $AG(b \rightarrow AfRg)$
- Observed signals
 - 3 observed signals

Coverage results

Observed	Number of	State	Transition
Signal	Properties	Coverage	Coverage
ack1	9	100%	100%
c1_o	7	100%	99.72%
dirty[0]	3	100%	95.49%

Transition coverage can reveal subtle coverage holes



Computation overhead

- ♦ T2: model checking with state coverage estimation
- T3: model checking with transition coverage estimation

Protocol	T1	T_2	T3
Configure	(Seconds)	(Seconds)	(Seconds)
2p2m	51	65	66
$_{\rm 3p2m}$	3956	4065	4071
2p4m	9938	10444	12592

 about 20% computation overhead for model checking

Summary

- Properties completeness analysis is an important issue for model checking
 Less effort for higher verification quality
 Transition coverage method for circuit FSM
 Target on transitions of FSM
 Extension of state coverage
 - Pinpoint through which transition the value of observed signal is checked
 - Able to uncover subtle coverage holes related with transitions
 - Iow computation overhead

Thank you for your attention!!