

Effect of Aging on Linear and Nonlinear MUX PUFs by Statistical Modeling

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
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OUTLINE

- MUX PUFs
- Authentication of PUFs from model parameters
- Total delay-difference distribution
- Aging model
 - Delay chain
 - Arbiter
 - Combined Model
- Monte-Carlo simulation
- Aging results
- Improving reliability

Physical unclonable function (PUFs)


- PUFs are hardware circuits that intrinsically store unique signatures without requiring non-volatile RAMs.
- The unique signature is a result of variations in the manufacturing process.
- For an N-stage MUX PUF: **N-bit challenge is *Input*** and **1-bit response is *Output***. A rising clock edge at the input traverses through the delay chain.




Example of Linear MUX PUF

Linear and Nonlinear PUFs


- An N-stage multiplexer (MUX) based PUF has:
 - **Delay chain:** N stages of top and bottom multiplexers.
 - **Arbiter:** A Latch/flip-flop at the end.



- Other configurations like **modified feed-forward** and **feed-forward** are formed by adding intermediate arbiters which generate internal challenge bits.
- This makes the PUF structure non-linear in nature.



PUF model for linear MUX PUF



- The response or output can be modelled in terms of the **delay-difference** of MUX stages.

- Delay-difference of i^{th} stage: $\Delta_i = D_i^t - D_i^b \sim N(0, 2\sigma^2)$

where D_i^t , D_i^b are the top and bottom multiplexer delays.

- Response bit, R , for a linear PUF can be decided based on **total delay-difference**, r_N as:

$$r_N = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i = \sum_{i=1}^N (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i + \Delta^{arb} \quad , \quad \begin{array}{l} C'_i = \bigoplus_{j=i}^N C_j \text{ corresponds to delay chain} \\ (C'_{N+1} = 0) \text{ corresponds to arbiter} \end{array}$$

$$R = \text{sign}(r_N) = \begin{cases} 1, & r_N \geq 0 \\ 0, & r_N < 0. \end{cases}$$

- Delay parameters, Δ^i and Δ^{arb} can be estimated using LMS method described in [3].

Authentication of PUFs


Chip enrollment phase:

Reference challenge-response pairs (CRPs) are stored as LUT in server.

We **propose** to store **model parameters** instead (i.e., delay-differences). Needs much less area compared to storing a LUT.

Authentication phase:

- Server receives an AUTH request with chip ID from user.
- Selects “random” challenges from database. These are sent to the user and responses are sent back to the server.
- User is **granted access** if the responses from chip match the responses stored/obtained in the server.
- Certain amount of error can be tolerated.



Authentication of Soft-PUFs

Stability of challenges:



- Due to variations by noise, the response to a challenge can vary upon multiple attempts. In such case, we want to classify challenges as stable and unstable in terms of their soft-response, R_s .

$$R_s = \frac{\#(\text{number of times response bit is 1})}{\text{total measurements}}$$

- Thresholds are defined to determine **stability** – If $R_s < 0.1$ or $R_s > 0.9$, challenge is termed *stable*, otherwise *unstable*.
- During authentication phase, it is desirable to select challenges that are stable.

Total delay-difference distribution


$$r_N = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i = \sum_{i=1}^N (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i + \Delta^{arb}$$



- % unstable challenges for feed-forward is much higher than linear – for example, 15% vs 11% (for chip-1)
- Standard deviation (σ) of total delay-difference, $r_N = 0.77$ (for chip-1)



AGING MODEL

- Aging is caused by undesirable changes in hardware structure such as **NBTI (Negative Bias Temperature instability)**, HCI (hot carrier injection) and TDDDB (time dependent dielectric breakdown).
- NBTI happens continuously when the circuit is powered on, whereas HCI only when the circuit has some activity.
- NBTI and HCI cause progressive slowdown in hardware and therefore, increase delays of hardware like MUX.
- Work in [5] showed that variance of **delay-differences of delay chain increases with aging, whereas mean of delay-difference can increase or decrease.**
- However, variations in delay-difference of the delay chain and arbiter delay is modeled in a slightly different manner.




Aging model for delay chain

$$r_N = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (-1)^{C_i'} \Delta^i = \sum_{i=1}^N (-1)^{C_i'} \Delta^i + \Delta^{arb}$$



- The delays of multiplexers increase with aging. However, the delay-difference can increase or decrease depending on whether the top or bottom multiplexer increases more.
- The **percent delay-difference variation**, p_i , is modeled as a Gaussian with zero mean and variance increasing with aging [6].
- New delay-difference is expressed as: $\Delta_{aged}^i = \Delta^i \left(1 + \frac{\Delta_{aged}^i - \Delta^i}{\Delta^i} \right) = \Delta^i (1 + p_i)$

Aging model for arbiter




$$r_N = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i = \sum_{i=1}^N (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i + \Delta^{arb}$$

- Arbiter is modeled in terms of its propagation delay (or clock-to-output time).
- However, unlike delay-differences, the arbiter delay takes positive value and therefore, has a positive mean.
- The **percent variation**, q , of arbiter delay is modeled as a Gaussian with positive mean and variance increasing with aging. Arbiter delay with aging is expressed as:

$$\Delta_{aged}^{arb} = \Delta^{arb} (1 + q)$$

- Arbiter ages in an asymmetric fashion [3] – the % variation, q , will be much higher than for delay-difference, p_i .



Combined Aging Model

- Environmental **noise is added** to account for variations in delay parameters.
- Total delay-difference with noise accounted for:

$$r_N = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (-1)^{C'_i} \Delta^i + \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} n_i$$

Model assumptions:

- Under a fixed environmental condition, the effect of noise is static (i.e., noise variance remains fixed).
- Variance of percent variations, p_i and q , increases with aging.
- For a fixed amount of aging, we can assume that the variance of $q > p_i$.

Monte-Carlo simulation for aging

- The original delay parameters are estimated using the LMS method for un-aged PUF.


| Delay Chain | Arbiter |
|--|--|
| $\Delta_{aged}^i = \Delta^i (1 + p_i)$ | $\Delta_{aged}^{arb} = \Delta^{arb} (1 + q)$ |
| Δ^i estimated from original PUF | Δ^{arb} estimated from original PUF |
| 1000 p_i samples from Gaussian with zero mean and $STD(p_i)$ | 1000 q samples from Gaussian with positive mean, μ and $STD(q)$; $\mu^2 = 3 Var(q)$ |

- Equal aging scenario:** when variation in delay chain and arbiter is assumed same/similar, i.e., $STD(p_i)=STD(q)$.
- Unequal aging scenario:** when variation in arbiter is more than delay chain, i.e., $STD(q)>STD(p_i)$. Due to asymmetric aging of arbiter, **this scenario is more likely.**



Performance Metrics

- **Reliability or intra-chip variation**
 - Authentication accuracy: % of responses which match with original responses.
 - Divergence between stable-0 and stable-1 distributions using divergence metrics like Jensen-Shannon (JSD) and Henze-Penrose (HPD).
- Uniqueness or inter-chip variation – how different are the responses of each PUF. Uniqueness improves due to random nature of aging.
- Randomness – ability to generate unbiased 0 or 1 as response bit. Randomness decreases due to increase in number of 1s with aging.
- **Experimental results are presented for a 32-stage Soft-PUF.**

Reliability: Authentication Accuracy (Equal aging)



- Percent variation considers equal variation in both p_i and q .
- **Reliability:** Linear > Modified FF > FF
- **Randomness** decreases as number of bit-flips *Stable-0-->1* are higher than *Stable-1-->0* for all 3 configs.
- Example: Feed-forward has 11.3% *Stable-0-->1* and 9.3% *Stable-1-->0*



Reliability: Authentication Accuracy (Equal aging)

AGING vs NOISE

TABLE I
PERCENTAGE SUCCESSFUL AUTHENTICATION UNDER EQUAL AGING
SCENARIO; $STD(q)=STD(p_i)$



| % STD | | No Noise | Noise STD=5% | Noise STD=10% | Noise STD=20% |
|--------|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| Linear | Original | 0.9993 | 0.9980 | 0.9930 | 0.9729 |
| | 5% | 0.9981 | 0.9967 | 0.9917 | 0.9714 |
| | 10% | 0.9927 | 0.9911 | 0.9860 | 0.9674 |
| | 20% | 0.9697 | 0.9683 | 0.9639 | 0.9487 |
| MFF | Original | 0.9985 | 0.9974 | 0.9921 | 0.9710 |
| | 5% | 0.9977 | 0.9963 | 0.9911 | 0.9698 |
| | 10% | 0.9923 | 0.9906 | 0.9854 | 0.9661 |
| | 20% | 0.9690 | 0.9675 | 0.9629 | 0.9486 |
| FF | Original | 0.9982 | 0.9954 | 0.9863 | 0.9528 |
| | 5% | 0.9955 | 0.9927 | 0.9837 | 0.9523 |
| | 10% | 0.9842 | 0.9817 | 0.9728 | 0.9450 |
| | 20% | 0.9463 | 0.9442 | 0.9387 | 0.9187 |

- %-authentication is more degraded in case of aging-alone than noise-alone.
- However, the degradation is not significant.

Example:

- %-authentication for FF with 20% $STD(p,q)$ is **94.63%**, whereas with 20% $STD(\text{noise})$ is **95.28%**.
- The difference between their performance is only **0.65%**.

Reliability: Authentication Accuracy (Unequal aging)



- Authentication accuracy with aging considered for delay chain and arbiter separately is shown.
- We expect $STD(q) > STD(p_i)$ \Rightarrow degradation due to arbiter becomes much more significant than due to delay chain.

Reliability: Authentication Accuracy (Unequal aging)

AGING vs NOISE

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE SUCCESSFUL AUTHENTICATION UNDER UNEQUAL AGING
SCENARIO; $STD(q)=STD(p_i)+20\%$

| % $STD(p, q)$ | | No Noise | Noise STD=5% | Noise STD=10% | Noise STD=20% |
|---------------|---------|----------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| Linear | (0,20) | 0.9961 | 0.9941 | 0.9892 | 0.9704 |
| | (5,25) | 0.9914 | 0.9898 | 0.9843 | 0.9657 |
| | (10,30) | 0.9825 | 0.9805 | 0.9761 | 0.9594 |
| | (20,40) | 0.9568 | 0.9556 | 0.9526 | 0.9409 |
| MF | (0,20) | 0.9960 | 0.9944 | 0.9891 | 0.9694 |
| | (5,25) | 0.9912 | 0.9896 | 0.9848 | 0.9663 |
| | (10,30) | 0.9827 | 0.9815 | 0.9761 | 0.9592 |
| | (20,40) | 0.9566 | 0.9561 | 0.9528 | 0.9391 |
| FF | (0,20) | 0.9795 | 0.9773 | 0.9700 | 0.9441 |
| | (5,25) | 0.9672 | 0.9654 | 0.9591 | 0.9354 |
| | (10,30) | 0.9506 | 0.9494 | 0.9433 | 0.9248 |
| | (20,40) | 0.9136 | 0.9124 | 0.9096 | 0.8937 |

- %-authentication is more degraded in case of aging-alone than noise-alone.
- However, the degradation in this case is much more significant.


Example:

- %-authentication for FF with 20% $STD(p_i)$, 40% $STD(q)$ is **91.36%**, whereas with 20% $STD(\text{noise})$ is **95.28%**.
- The difference between their performance now is **3.92%**.

Reliability: Divergence Metrics

Total delay-difference distribution of stable 0 and stable 1

- Ideally, there should be no overlap between the stable 0 and stable 1 distributions – represents error/noise of the model.
- With aging, as delay parameters start to vary, the overlap between these distributions increase.
- This overlap reflects the bit-flips occurring in the responses of these challenges.
- Metrics like Jensen-Shannon, Henze-Penrose divergence are used to analyze these overlaps.



Probability distributions for unaged linear MUX PUF


Reliability: Divergence Metrics

- **Jensen-Shannon divergence:** symmetric form of KL divergence. KL divergence was found to be sensitive to low values of probability.

$$JS(P||Q) = \frac{1}{2}(KL(P||R) + KL(Q||R)),$$

$$\text{where } R = \frac{1}{2}(P + Q)$$



- **Henze-Penrose divergence [7]:** Randomly sample r_N from a set of r_N values obtained for an equal number of Stable-0 and Stable-1 CRPs. Sort them in increasing/decreasing order and count the number of differing classification, R out of total N . HPD is computed as: ***HPD = 1 - R/N***



$$STD(q) = STD(p_i) = \frac{STD(n_i)}{STD(\Delta_i)} = 30\%$$

Probability distributions with 30% variation due to aging/noise

Reliability: Divergence Metrics





- Dashed lines show the performance in case of **noise-alone** and solid line for the case of **aging-alone** scenario.
- A lower divergence value corresponds to a higher overlap between the Stable-0 and Stable-1 distributions.
- Range of JSD is 0-1 and HPD is 0.5-1.

Improving reliability

- **Recalibration:** The delay parameters can be recalibrated using LMS method. But not feasible as thousands of devices will need to be need calibration.
- **Tuning a threshold** based on total delay-difference, r_N :
 - Challenges with r_N close to 0 are more prone to aging related bit-flips.
 - Therefore, choosing a threshold on r_N will improve the reliability albeit a lower number of available challenges.
 - Higher the threshold, better reliability is guaranteed.
 - However, we do not need 100% reliability as certain error in the responses to the set of challenges is tolerated. Threshold requirement is further lower in this case.

Improving reliability of 32-stage PUF



Plots show % Error in authentication by considering only CRPs with $|r_N| \geq \beta$.

Example:

- Error Tolerance = 1.5%, Thresholds for $\text{STD}(p_i)=\text{STD}(q)=33\%$ (equal) amount of aging - **0.275** for linear, **1.4** for feed-forward.
- # of challenges with $|r_N| \geq \beta, \text{threshold}$ - 2^{31} , 2^{26} respectively.

Conclusion

- Aging effects of delay chain and arbiter can be modeled in terms of Gaussian distributions.
- Aging degradation is similar (or slightly worse) to that of noise under equal aging scenario. This is because aging and noise are modeled in a similar manner.
- Under the assumption that **arbiter “ages” much more significantly than delay chain** (unequal aging), the performance degradation due to aging is much more prominent compared to noise.
- The performance degradation due to aging can be improved by **tuning thresholds** based on **total delay-difference**. This decreases the number of challenges available for authentication purposes.