

A Nonvolatile Flip-Flop-Enabled Cryptographic Wireless Authentication Tag with Per-Query Key Update and Power-Glitch Attack Countermeasures

Chiraag Juvekar¹, Hyung-Min Lee², Joyce Kwong³,
and Anantha Chandrakasan¹

¹Massachusetts Institute of Technology

²Korea University, ³Texas Instruments




\$30 million worth **fake wines** were seized in 2012

In 2014, Aston Martin recalled 18,000 cars due to **counterfeit brake pedals**




Fake malaria drugs caused 100,000 deaths in Africa

System Overview and Threat Model




Threat Model:

- **Passive attacks** against the tag such as DPA/DEMA
- **Non-invasive active attacks** like power glitch attacks





Key Features




- Regulating Voltage Multiplier
 - Pulse-based Telemetry
 - Key Update Protocol
 - Keccak Cryptographic Core
 - NV-DFF Key-storage
 - FeCap-based Energy Backup
- Wireless power/data for compact-size tag
- To prevent side-channel attack
- To limit power-glitch attack

Area-Optimal Energy Backup Unit



- **3.5nJ** backup energy requirement
- C_{BK} (HV FeCap) has **3.4x higher energy density** including regulator efficiency than C_L (LV FeCap)
- Energy Backup Unit **needs 2.2x less area** compared to single output cap


Power-Glitch Countermeasures



Power Glitch Causes:

- Reader is pulled away
- Malicious Reader

Guaranteed safe backup and key update



Backup w/ Worst-Case Glitch Event

The tag safely performs:

- NVDFF restore
- Key update
- NVDFF backup